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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence entered following a conditional AlJrord
guilty plea to a single count of felony DUI.' Clerk's Record (R)144, 152.
B. Procedural Historv and Statement of Facts
Appellant Albert Moore was issued a misdemeanor citation for DUI and driving without
privileges on September 3,2006. R 10. On September 5,2006, he entered a not guilty plea and a
jury trial was set for February 21,2007. R 3, 11. On September 18, 2006, his license was
suspended for a year based upon the refusal of a BAC. R 12.
On January 23,2007, a pre-trial conference was held. At that time, Mr. Moore waived
his right to a jury trial and a court trial was set for May 14,2007. R 4.
Then, on March 1, 2007, an ainei~dedcomplaint was filed charging misdelneanor DUI
(second offense within 10 years) and driving without privileges. R 26. On May 11, 2007, a court
trial was set for July 23, 2007. R 4. And, on the 23rdof July, the case was apparently set over to
September 12,2007, for a plea and sentencing hearing. R 30. However, on September 12,2007,
the case was reset for a jury trial on December 14,2007. R 4. And, at the pre-trial conference,
the trial date was again changed, this time to February 15, 2008. R 4.
Then, on January 4,2008, a second amended comnplaint was filed charging felony DUI
and DWP. CR 34. And, on January 10,2008, Mr. Moore filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

I.C. 5 19-3501(4). R 36.
A preliminary hearing was held, and on March 24,2008, an information was filed

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,91 S.Ct. 160 (1970).
1

charging one violation of I.C.

$5 18-8004, 8005(5), felony DUI, and one violation of I.C. 5 18-

8001(4), misdemeanor driving without privileges. R 56. On March 26,2008, Mr. Moore was
arraigned on the amended complaint. R 62.
On May 16,2008, Mr. Moore filed a brief in support of his motion to dismiss. Ex. on
Appeal. The state responded. R 83.
A hearing was held on June 12,2008, after which supplemental briefing was filed by both
the state and defense. R 107, Exhibits on Appeal. Ultimately, the court denied the motion to
dismiss. R 107-112.

In the order denying the motion to dismiss, the district court found that there was 110
statutory language to support a finding that the amendment of the charge from misdemeanor to
felony renewed the statutory speedy trial period. R 109. However, in considering the causes of
the delay, the prosecution's delay in researching Mr. Moore's history which resulted in the
amendment of the charge, Mr. Moore's initial waiver of a jury trial and then the re-invocation of
that right, and scheduling issues for a state's witness, the district court found that there was good
cause for the delay a i d therefore no speedy trial violation. R 111-112.
Mr. Moore then entered a conditional Alford guilty plea to felony DUI and was sentenced
to six years with one year fixed to run concurrently with the sentence he was serving in another
case, State v. Moore, S.Ct. No. 35486. R 144-5. At the plea hearing, Mr. Moore stated that he
wished to retain his right to appeal both the denial of the speedy trial motion and an issue of
whether a prior North Dakota conviction could be used as a prior DUI. That issue was and is
being litigated in his other case, State v. Moore, SS.Ct.No. 35486. Tr. 1211108 p. 78, in. 1-6, p.

79, In. 2-14,' In accepting the guilty plea, the court informed Mr. Moore that if the North
Dakota conviction is found invalid for purposes of a felony DUI conviction in Idaho in his other
case, this case will return to the district court where it could either be dismissed or reduced to a
misdemeanor charge. Tr. 12/1/08 p. 79, In. 2-14. And, the court reinfonlled Mr. Moore of the
ability to appeal the use of the North Dakota conviction at the sentencing hearing. Tr. 12131/08
p. 98, In. 12-17.
The district court did not order a new PSI for Mr. Moore, but rather relied on the PSI
prepared for State v. Moore, S.Ct. No. 35486, Tr. 1211108 p. 89, in. 16-18, Tr. 12131108 p. 91, In.
24-25, p. 92, In. 1-2. At sentencing, both the state and the defense requested a sentence of six
years with one fixed to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in case No. 35486. Tr.
12/31/08 p. 93, in. 14-18, p. 95, In. 12-17. And, this was the sentence imposed. R 144-5.
This appeal timely followed. R 147.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Was Mr. Moore denied his federal and state co~lstitutionalrights to speedy trial by the
18 month delay without good cause between his arrest and the time he filed a motion to dismiss?
2. Was Mr. Moore denied his statutory right to speedy trial given the unexcused 18
month delay between arrest and the filing of his motion for dismissal?
3. Should this case be remanded based upon the decision in S.Ct. No. 35486 as to
whether the prior conviction from North Dakota can be used in these Idaho DUI prosecutions?

' Mr. Moore has moved for consolidation of this case and case No. 35486
3

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Mr. Moore was Denied his Federal and State Constitutional and State Statutory Rights
to a Soeedv Trial.
Mr. Moore was arrested and issued a citation on September 9, 2006. Eighteen months
later, on January 10, 2008, he filed a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation. This long
delay, three times the statutory allowance of six months, was a violation of both his state and
federal constitutional rights as well as his state statutory rights to a speedy trial. U.S. Const
Amend. 6, 14; Idaho Consl. art. I,

5 13; LC. 5

19-3501.

1. Standard of Review
The question of wbether there was a violation of the right to speedy trial is a mixed
question of fact and law. The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if
supported by substantial and competent evidence and exercises free review of the trial court's
coilclusions of law. State v. McKeetlz, 136 Idaho 619,626, 38 P.3d 1275, 1282 (Ct. App. 2001),
rev. denied (2002)
2. The 18 Month Delay Violated the Federal and State
Constitutional Rights to a Speedy Trial.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution guarantee a
speedy trial. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2005). And, the
Idaho Constitution guarantees "a speedy and public trial." Idaho Const. art. I,

5 13; State v.

Davis, supra.

The constitutional speedy trial guarantee is intended to minimize the possibility of
lenglhy incarceration prior to trial; to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment
of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail; and to shorten the disruption of life

caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. State v. Davis, supra, citing
United States v. LoudHawI, 474 U.S. 302, 31 1, 106 S.Ct. 648, 654 (1986); United States v.
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1,8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502 (1982).
Under hot11 the federal and the state constitutions, the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514,92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), is used to determine whether a defendant's constitutional
rights to a speedy trial were violated. State v. Davis, supra. Four factors are weighed: 1) the
length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a
speedy trial; and 4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530,92
S.Ct. at 2192; State v. Davis, stlpra.
The constitutional right to a speedy trial applies throughout a formal criminal prosecution,
from the time the accused is indicted, arrested, or otherwise fornlally accused to the time the
charges are resolved or dismissed. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho at 836, 118 P.3d at 168, citing
Barker, supra; Doggett v. Uii.itedStates, 505 U.S. 647, 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686,2692-93 (1992),
MacDonald, supra; State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117,29 P.3d 949,953 (2001).
Applying the Barker factors, it is clear that Mr. Moore's constitutional rights to a speedy
trial were violated.
a. Length of Delay
A delay of 18 months existed at the time Mr. Moore filed his motion to dismiss. Such a

delay in a DUI case is presumptively prejudicial. Stale v. Davis, supra, (finding that an 18 month
delay in prosecuting a DUI was of a length as to require judicial scrutiny of the remaining Barker
factors). See also, State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 33-37,921 P.2d 206,210-14 (Ct. App.
1996) (A delay of over 13 months sufficient to trigger judicial scrutiny for a complex conspiracy

charge.)
Moreover, the longer the delay the stronger the reasons must be to justify it. Slate v.
Ifernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 11,27 P.3d 417,420 (Ct. App. 2001). See also, State v. Luizd, 124
Idaho 290,292, 858 P.2d 829, 831 (Ct. App. 1993), "The longer the delay in a given case, the
more weight will be given to this factor and the harder it will be to show good cause." An
eighteen month delay existed when Mr. Moore filed his motion to dismiss. By the time the
motion was decided, he'd been subjected to nearly six more months of waiting for a trial date.
This nearly two year delay is a very long delay and one that requires very substantial reasons for
justification.
b. Reason for Delay
In evaluating the reasons for a delay, different weights are assigned to different reasons.
Davis, supra, citing, Loud Ifuwk, 474 U.S. at 31 5, 106 S.Ct. at 656. Some reasons for delay are
valid, such as the need for time to collect witnesses, oppose pretrial motions, or locate a missing
defendant. Id. And, while an unavailable witness may be a valid reason for a delay, it is
important lo distinguish between a witness who is truly unavailable and one who would be
inconvenienced by the trial setting. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to
attend. Id.
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense weighs heavily

against the state. Davis, supra, citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. More neutral
reasons such as negligence or court congestion weigh less heavily, but nonetheless weigh against
the state because the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances rests with the state rather than
the accused. Davis, supra, citing Barker, supra; State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83,89, 844 P.2d

712, 718 (Ct. App. 1992). Further, negligence is not automatically tolerable simply because the
accused cannot demonstrate how the delay prejudiced him. Davis, supva, citing Doggett, 505
U.S. at 657,223 S.Ct. at 2693-94. "Although negligence is weighted more lightly than a
deliberate intent to harm tile accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide
between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution. Id
The district court found three reasons for the delay in this case: 1) the state's lack of
diligence in researching Mr. Moore's prior history; 2) Mr. Moore first requesting a court trial and
then requesting a jury trial; and 3) the fact that the trial had been scheduled to accommodate the
schedule of one of the state's witnesses.
The first reason, the delay in researching the case, is negligence on the part of the state.
This, as stated in Davis, falls on the wrong side between acceptable and unacceptable reasons.
The second reason cited by the court was Mr. Moore's decision first to waive a jury trial
and then to re-invoke that right. The court also mentioned that time was taken up by plea
negotiations. While the courl implicitly found that these delays could not be counted against the
state, State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494,745 P.2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987), holds to the contrary

Stuart states: "Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." 113
Idaho at 496,745 P.2d at 1117. In Stuart, the delay in hying Stuart was attributed to Stuart
having filed and then later abandoned a motion to dismiss. The Court wrote:

. . . The six-month time limitation for speedy trial under LC. 5 19-3501 does not
represent a whimsical time frame. It is designed to accolnmodate a reasonable
number of pretrial motions. Stuart asserted a single motion but abandoned it.
Such action is not an appropriate ground for delaying the trial beyond six months
Trial courts must be diligent in securing compliance with time restraints. . . .

In accord with Stuart, the time consumed by Mr. Moore's initial waiver of and then reinvocation of his right to a jury trial and plea negotiations should not be weighed against him in
determining whether there was a speedy trial violation.
However, even if Stuart did not hold that pretrial motions do 1101 excuse a failure to
timely set a trial, in this case, the delay cannot be attributed to Mr. Moore's actions. Mr. Moore
was arrested on September 3, 2006. R 10. The six month statutory window for trial therefore
expired on March 3, 2007. Mr. Moore waived his right to a jury trial on January 12, 2007. R 24.
And, just two days before the statutory speedy trial time would run, the state filed its first
amended complaint. R 26. And, on May 1,2007, nearly 8 months after his arrest, and well
before Mr. Moore decided to re-invoke his right to a jury trial, the court had still not set the
matter for a court trial. R 39. It was not until September 7,2007, one year later and twice the
statutory speedy trial time limit, that Mr. Moore requested to have a jury trial instead of a court
trial. R 3 1. This year's delay cannot be attributed to Mr. Moore's re-invocation of his right to a
jury trial, because he had not yet re-invoked that right. Further, nowhere in the record is there
any indication that a trial date was postponed or reset based on Mr. Moore's actions in plea
negotiations. It takes two parties to negotiate, and there is no indication anywhere in this record
that somehow Mr. Moore alone was responsible for the time taken to reach a plea agreement in
this case. In fact, to the contrary, the state was still amending its charges on January 4, 2008, 16
months after the initial arrest. R 34. If anything, the state's dilatory research into whether it
should charge this offense as a first, second, or third DUI appears on the record to be a far greater
cause of delay than any action 011Mr. Moore's part.
Like the first reason, negligence on the part of the state in preparing its case, this second

reason, the waiver of and then re-invocation of a jury trial right and plea negotiations, does not
weigh against Mr. Moore. Even if Mr. Moore had never re-invoked his right to a jury trial, there
would have been a speedy trial violation. There was no reason why the trial court needed to
change the February 21,2007, trial date simply because Mr. Moore waived his right to a jury trial
011 January
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The final reason cited by the district court for the delay was to accommodate the schedule
of a peace officer witness for the state. The district court declined to find that this part of the
delay could be weighed against the state, citing Davis. The district court wrote, "hDavis, the
court could not attribute an anlbiguous scheduling issue [based on witness availability] to the
State without more indication on the record." R 111. This, however, is a mis-reading of Davis.

In Davis, the Court of Appeals first noted the enormous difference between a witness
being inconvenienced and being unavailable. While the first would not be a good reason for a
delay, the second would. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 170. The Court of
Appeals then wrote:
In Davis's original prosecution, the district court found that the reason for the
delay in bringing Davis to trial was based on the convenience of the witnesses,
was weak, and reflected poor cominunication between the state and its witnesses.
However, the district court found that there was no evidence that the state held a
motive to delay in substantial fashion, harass, or forum-shop by failing to
promptly prosecute Davis. We conclude that there was nojust$cation to excuse
the ten-month lapse between Davis's arrest and the dismissal of the original
charge but that the reason for that delay gravitates towards negligence. Thus,
although not weighed as heavily against the state as a badjiaith delay, the delay
in. the original prosecution is attributable to the state.
Id (emphasis added). See also, State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,260-1, 16 P.3d 931, 936-7 (2000)

(Accommodation of schedule of complaining witness who was traveling out of state did not

constitute good cause for a delay).

In Davis, the Court of Appeals did, in fact, attribute the delay due to witness convenience
to the state. Likewise in this case, the court should have attributed the delay due to witness
convenience to the state. The only notation in the record regarding the witness issue is on the
court minutes for January 12, 2007. In those minutes, it is written: "Per Marjorie Set on officer
schedule." R 24. The burden is on the state to show good cause. State v. Lund, 124 Idaho 290,
292, 858 P.2d 829, 831 (Ct. App. 1993). A record indicating only that the trial is to be set per a11
officer's schedule does not establish in any way witness unavailability. Rather, it appears to
suggest witness convenience, because if the officer was truly unavailable the notation would have
stated something like "set for time after officer's surgery" or some such specific time frame. As
in Davis, the delay attributable to the officer's schedule, though perhaps not weighted as heavily
as a bad-faith delay, nonetheless weighs against the state.
There were three reasons found for the delay in getting this case to trial: 1) state
negligence in researching the case; 2) Mr. Moore's waiver and then assertion of his right to a jury
trial; and 3) witness schedule. One of these, the waiver and re-invocation of the right to a jury
trial was a non-reason both because the six month statutory period allows for pre-trial motions
and because the trial was delayed far past the statutory speedy trial lime long before Mr. Moore
ever re-invoked his right to a jury trial. The other two reasons weigh against the state. Given
that, it cannot be said that there was a good reason for the delay.
c. Assertion ofthe Right to Speedy Trial

In considering Mr. Moore's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the district court said it
would not assume an outright waiver of the right, hut noted that several trial dates were set well

past the speedy trial deadline before Mr. Moore moved to d i ~ m i s s .However,
~
while this is tnie,
Mr. Moore did move to dismiss for speedy trial violations on January 10, 2008, 18 months after
his initial arrest. Yet, the motion to dismiss was not even decided until July 11, 2008. R 36, 112.
So, there was a delay of six months just from the time he filed his motion to the decision on the
motion. Even if Mr. Moore is somehow penalized and denied speedy trial rights for the period
before he filed his motion to dismiss, there was still a substantial delay in setting his case for trial
after his motion was filed. That fact should weigh in favor of finding a violation of the
constitutional right to speedy trial.
d. Prejudice
Ths district court recognized that the delay in trying Mr. Moore caused him anxiety and
uncertainty. R 111-2. And, indeed, such prejudice can weigh in favor of a finding of a speedy
trial violation. As the Davis court stated, negligence is not automatically tolerable simply
because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him or her. State v. Davis,
141 Idaho at 837-8,118 P.3d at 169-70, citingDoggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693-94.
The Barker factors, length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right to speedy
trial, and prejudice, require a finding that there was a violatioil of the federal and state
constitutional rights to speedy trial. The district court order finding to the contrary must now be
reversed and the matter remanded for dismissal.

Xt may be that Mr. Moore invoked his right to speedy trial at his initial arraignment. He
has moved to augment the appellate record with the videotape of that arraignment. Coullsel will
review that tape when it becomes available and alert the Court to its contents either through
briefing or argument.

3. The 18Month Delay Also Violated the Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial.
The delay in this case violated the state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial
and the order denying the motion to dismiss must be reversed. In addition, in Idaho, LC. § 193501 supplements the constitutional protections and any case not tried prior to the expiration of
the six month time limit must be dismissed absent a showing of"good cause" by the state. In!;
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,257, 16 P.3d 931,933 (2000).4 Given there was no good cause
for the delay in this case, the delay also violated the statutory right to a speedy trial.
The initial question raised in this case by the state was whether the six month time limit
of the statute "renewed" itself when the state filed an amended complaiiit increasing the DUI
charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. R 85. While noting that the issue would he one of first
impression, the district court found no la~iguageto support a "renewal" of the speedy trial limit.

R 109.
The state looked to State v. Horsely, 117 Idaho 920, 792 P.2d 945 (1990), to support its
position that the amendment of the complaint restarted the statutory speedy trial period
However, the district court was correct in its analysis that Horsely involved a complaint that had
been dismissed and refiled, not amended, and that no language in the case would support a
renewal ofthe time limit based only upon the amendment of a complaint. And, in fact, State v.
McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 627, 38 P.3d at 1283, states "[tlhe time limitatioii is not renewed absent a
formal dismissal and refiling of the original charges." In McKeeth, the Court of Appeals held

Although the district court order does not specifically separate the requirements of the
federal and state constitutions and those of I.C. 5 19-3501, the court later stated that its analysis
was intended to apply to both the alleged constitutional violations and statutory violation. Tr.
8/6/08 p. 40, in. 10-21.

that the amendment of a misdemeanor complaint did not restart the statuto~yspeedy trial time
clock. Likewise here, the state's amendment of the charges did not restart the statutory speedy
trial clock
The statute requires "good cause" for a delay past six months. Analysis of good cause
may take into account the Barker factors, but it is not defined by those factors. As set out in
Clark:

. . . a thorough analysis of the reasons for the delay represents the soundest
method for determining what constitutes good cause. We therefore conclude that
good cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal
excuse ofthe delay. Because there is not a fixed rule for determining good cause
for the delay of a trial, the matter is initially lefi to the discretion of the trial court.
But . . . the reason for the delay 'cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum.' The
good cause determination may take into account the factors listed in Barker. The
Barlcer factors, however,
Considered only as surrounding circumsta~~ces
. . . are important, if
at all, only insofar as they bear on the sufficiency of the reason
itself. The shortness of the period. the failure of the defendant to
demand a speedy trial, and the absence of prejudice are legitimate
considerations only insofar as they affect the strength
- of the reason
for the delay. This means that, to whatever extent the delay has
been a short one, or the defendant has not demanded a speedy trial,
a weaker reason will constitute good cause. On the other hand, if
the delay has been a long one, or if the defendant has demanded a
speedy trial, or is prejudiced, a stronger reason is necessary to
constitute good cause.
[State v. Peterson], 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980).
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 260 (citations omitted).

In this case, the primary reasons for the delay were state negligence in researching the
case and the desire to set the case around a peace officer's schedule. While the district court
noted that Mr. Moore's decision to reinvoke his right to a jury trial might have played a part in

the delay, that re-invocation did not occur until the case was already six months past the statutory
time limit, so whatever minimal role Mr. Moore played should not have affected the statutory
analysis.
State negligence and the desire to accommodate a peace officer's schedule are not reasons
which amount to good cause for missing the statutory deadline. The other Barker factors only go
to affect the strength ofthe reason for the delay. Id. Here, there was no good reason ibr the
delay. The extreme length of the delay, 22 months by the time the court denied the motion to
dismiss, is disturbing, and if the state had had a weak reason for the delay, such a long delay
might overcome that reason so as to require dismissal in any event. However, given there was no
good reason at all, the length ofthe delay makes the situation neither better nor worse insofar as
dismissal is required in any event. Likewise, given there was no good reason for the delay,
whether Mr. Moore did or did not demand speedy trial sooner or later, or whether he suffered
more or less prejudice than any other person required to spend nearly two years of his life
awaiting a trial setting is immaterial. When there is no good cause for a delay, the presence or
absence of the remaining Barker factors can neither strengthen or weaken it. When something
does not exist, it cannot be increased or decreased.
Because there was no good cause for the delay pas1 the statutory time limit of six months,
the district court should have dismissed the case.
B. If Relief is Granted in S.Ct. No. 35486, This Case should be Remanded for
Further Proceedings.
Both at the time the guilty plea was entered and at sentencing, the district court and Mr.
Moore agreed that if his DUI conviction in case No. 35486 is reversed because the North Dakota

prior conviction should not have been used to make the offense a felony, then this case would
return to the district court either for dismissal or withdrawal of the plea. Tr. 12/1/08 p. 78, in, 16, p. 79,111.2-14, Tr. 12131/08 p. 98, In, 12-23.
Mr. Moore has asked that this case be consolidated with case No. 35486 and he
incorporates all briefing submitted on his behalf in that case into this case in full.
He therefore requests that if relief is granted in case No. 35486, that this case be

remanded to the district court for further proceedings as intended by the district court.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Moore requests that this Court find that the district
court erred in denying his lnotion to dismiss for constitutional and statutory speedy trial
violations.
Mr. Moore also requests for the reasons'set forth in case No. 35486, that if relief is
granted in that case, this case also be remanded for fulther proceedings as intended by the district
COUlt.
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